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Abstract/Resumo: 
 
We present an economic growth model with human capital, based upon Arrow (1962), in which we assess 
the impact of political leadership change either in governments or political parties. The change of 
leadership might be seen as a change in embedded human capital, and thus we might evaluate the loss or 
gain for society due to these political activities. The approach is theoretical using Arrowian economic 
setting. We formulate the conditions in which it is worth it, or how long does it take to recover from a 
political leadership change. The embedded process is an economic one, known as “learning by doing”, but 
this time applied to political processes. 
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1. Motivation 
 The motivation of this paper is to answer the question: How does political leadership 
change affects the performance of the cabinet and/or  parties, and thus, what are their 
impacts on society due to human capital leadership change?  
 The question is daunting and defying, and thus we shall confine us to a small formal 
model in which we use human capital change to evaluate the framework. Aside, epistemic 
considerations, namely Popperian, Nozickian, Khunian and a lot more that could be 
expressed, we only assess the impact of the following formal human capital model on 
growth, and thus on society. 
 The framework we would like to use is the economic framework of the Nobel 
laureate, Kenneth Arrow (1962). Basically, we start from a human capital approach to 
political leadership, then we use the extended human capital framework, with (LBD) 
learning by doing. 
 The change of leadership might be seen as a change in embedded human capital, and 
thus we might evaluate the loss or gain for society due to these political activities. The 
approach is theoretical using Arrowian economic setting. We formulate the conditions in 
which it is worth it, or how long does it take to recover from a political leadership change. 
The embedded process is an economic one, known as “learning by doing”, but this time 
applied to political processes. 
           This interest in the Arrowian model gets back as my PhD dissertation (Rocha de 
Sousa, 2008) where we applied it to human capital effects of land reforms, in the economic 
domain. The roots of the model are the same, but the context is rather new, now it is 
applied in a political framework. 
 
2. Literature on the subject: From economic human capital to political leadership 
 The literature on human capital goes as far back as Smith (1776), but the recent 
explosion of human capital assessment started in the Chicago School of Economics, namely 
firstly with Mincer in the 60’s, and more recently with all the work (of also Nobel laureate) 
Gary Becker. 
 Human capital by these authors can be classified in two types: i) formal education, as 
degrees (primary, secondary and tertiary education with Bas, masters, PhDs) and ii) 
experience, that can be attributed as on the job training. 
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 There are proxy variables for human capital, for instance in the sense of economic 
development, health indicators are used as proxies for human capital, because for workers 
or students to work in order to get experienced or to study in order to get a degree, they 
need to be healthy. 
 In our model we consider the two types of human capital embedded indistinctively, 
but nevertheless, we can consider that, even the model works for both types, in the political 
case of leadership change we must focus more on the experience side. Why, we might ask? 
We can immediately recall political leaders without formal education, namely Jacques 
Delors – see Grant (1994), but whose experience more than compensated his lack of formal 
training.  
          The higher focus on experience side, lead us to adopt the Arrowian setting of (LBD) 
learning by doing. 
          We won’t spend time and space resuming again the original approach of Arrow 
(1962), but we must stress that his application was done only to physical capital, but some 
economists have thus extended this approach to human capital. Again, Rocha de Sousa 
(2008) does an extension of the effects of human capital shocks to land reform economic 
growth assessment. 
 
3. Our approach: Arrowian model with LBD 
      We use Arrow’s (1962) economic growth model with “learning by doing” (LBD) to 
evaluate and assess the aggregate loss of welfare due to leadership reform. Besides, we use 
Arrow’s model adapted with human capital. 
 
Main Hypothesis:  During traditional leadership reform all the human capital is destroyed 
since we have the substitution of experienced managers and politicians by leaders to be 
with few or at all no experience. 
 
         This hypothesis will be further enlarged to partial human capital loss. 
 
Main Question:  
How many years does it take to recover human capital loss due to leadership change? 
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We have the stream of future profits (S) with human capital: 
    . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . .
T
t tS e H t W e dt    
In which  is the inter-temporal discount rate (or the interest rate or opportunity cost of  
project’s evaluation),  ( )H t  is a production function which results from human   capital  
 
investment till moment t, and                represents unitary profit derived from a wage cost W, 
with  denoting wage growth rate. 
So we must now compare two profits streams: the discounted incumbent leader profit flow 
since the beginning till the time of political leadership change, that is Agent Gain (SAGN), 
with the profits flow of the new leader (leader To Be) since the time of change or reform 
announcement (RA) till a period in which all the human capital is recovered (T**), and we 
name it (STB): 
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Hypothesis 2: we assume that the interest rate is the same (i.e. is not affected by political 
leadership change), that wage growth rate, , is the same and that the production 
 ( )H t and the profit rate is also the same: . 
Do notice that these hypotheses can be changed without major changes in the quality of the 
model’s results. 
 
Dynamic Recovery Threshold of Traditional Leadership Change (DRTTLC) 
In this analysis we aim to compare SAGN and STB to obtain T**. This is the time value from 
which after a political reform all human capital is totally recovered by the new leader. 
The following condition allows us to formalize DRTTLC: 
  
Thus, replacing by the respective function discounted cash-flows values: 
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Like all variables and integrand functions (given all our resctritive initial hypotheses) are 
the same, the DRTTLC analysis is based upon the integration limits: 
 
**
0
(´ ). (´ ).
RA
RA
TT
RA
T
Z t T dt Z t dt    
Thus, solving for the gain function(Z(t)): 
 
**( ) ( ) ( ) (0)RA RA RA RAZ T T Z T T Z T Z      
Which will be equivalent, since ( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z   can be eliminated by being common 
to both members, and if Z(t) monotonous increasing1: 
**( ) ( )RA RAZ T T Z T   
**( ) 2. ( )RAZ T Z T  
From here we can derive that the dynamic profitability comes defined by the implict 
function. By the injectivity of the gain function (Z(.)) we can state that the gains on the 
threshold T** have to exceed at least the double of accumulated gains till leadership 
reform. 
Figure 1 presents the Possibility Set of Leadership Reform (PSLR), accordingly to the 
condition of recovery of human capital loss in the space of possible gains (Z(T**) vs 
Z(TRA)). 
 
Figure 1 – Possibility Sets of Leadership Reform on ARROW’s model (1962) 
 
 
For a simple case in which the gain function is linear (thus T**=2TRA), it is the inferior line 
                                                     
1 The initial hypothesis we used was the separability of the function, but this one is too restrictive. It is 
enough to state that the function is increasingly monotonous to withdraw the conclusion in the text. 
Z(T1) Z(TRA) 
Z(T2)=2.Z(T1) 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
Z(T2) 
FLR Z(T**) 
6 
 
which defines the Possibility Set of Leadership Reform (PSLR)– see next figure. 
 
Figure 2 - Possibility Sets of Leadership Reform with linear gain in ARROW (1962) 
 
 
Some interesting questions might arise in this model in which we proceed to leadership 
change reform (even without formal political variable). Let us change the wage growth. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
If the growth wage rate increases due to a process of leadership change reform, what 
happens to the dynamic recovery threshold of leadership change (DRTTLC)? 
 
Let’s analyze the cash-flow condition of an ex-post wage rate increase after the leadership 
reform, i.e. with , we will have the following condition: 
       2 1
**
. .. .
2 1
0
(.; ) . ( ) . 1 . . . ( ) . 1 . . (.; )
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T
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This condition will be the one which will allow in this context that leadership reform 
recovered all the lost human capital. 
 
4. Principal theoretical results 
Proposition 1: 
An increase in the growth rate of (unskilled2) wages                ex-post leadership reform              
                                                     
2 We refer to unskilled or undifferentiated wages, thus to non-specific functions and for those which do not 
2 1 
T1 TRA 
T2=2.T1 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
T2 
FLR T** 
2 1 
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yields leadership reform unviable in terms of economic efficiency. Thus, in this context and 
under the referred hypotheses there will be an aggregate welfare loss which yields in 
dynamic terms leadership reform inefficient; i.e. the loss generated by the eviction of agent 
gain (AGN) and by theirs human capital loss will never be recovered with wage increase.3 
Demonstration: see Rocha de Sousa (2008: 224-5). 
 
Proposition 2 
If there is a decrease on wage growth rate after leadership reform, then it is possible to 
define a new possibility set of leadership reform accordingly to the Dynamic Recovery 
Threshold of Traditional Leadership Change. 
Demonstration: See Rocha de Sousa (2008: 225-6). 
 
Proposition 3 
If the inter-temporal discount rate increases ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery 
Threshold of Traditional Leadership Change becomes unattainable, thus leadership reform 
is inefficient.  
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008:226). 
 
Proposition 4 
If the inter-temporal discount rate decreases ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery 
Threshold of Traditional Leadership Change becomes more easily attainable. 
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008: 227). 
 
Hypothesis 4 – New working hypothesis – partial human capital destruction 
If the eviction of the incumbent agent (AGN) by leaders to be (TB), instead of being totally 
un-experienced and illiterate, they inherit some experience, thus human capital loss is only 
partial. 
If we can measure it by a factor of literacy which we name , then part of them are not 
                                                                                                                                                                           
demand human capital – thus for factor L and not H. This proposition becomes interesting because 
empirically tends to be checked as after leadership reform there tends to have an increase in these types of 
wages due to the greater lobbying union power – specially on those LR of the more interventionist type. 
3Notice we are considering T** fixed. This result might change with T** variable, but within Arrow’s model 
capital (in our case human capital) tends to have a finite life, and thus the plausibility of this hypothesis. 
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totally un-experienced  in terms of political management and leadership techniques. These 
new leaders might possess some knowledge of modern management techniques, new 
ideas. Nevertheless, even if we assume a decrease on the knowledge gap, we still assume 
certain uniformity on the literacy and numeracy differentials between incumbent agents 
(AGN) and leaders To Be (TB). 
 
Question 2: What happens to Leadership change or Leadership Reform in this setting? 
Human capital recovery will be faster. 
Demonstration: 
Intuitively the human capital loss will be lower in the leadership reform moment, i.e. there 
is a kind of heritage from agents to leaders to be – thus the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of 
Leadership Change can be more easily attained than in the initial case. 
Formally we must compare: 
 1TB AGNS S   
Thus, the term . AGNS  is the bequest or heritage from agents (AGN) to leaders to be (TB), 
and so the human capital recovery must occur only till:  1 AGNS . Formally: 
           
**
. . . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . . 1 . . ( ) . 1 . . 1 .
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RA
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t t t t
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T
S e H t T W e dt e H t W e dt S               
Thus, proceeding as in the initial case, we must take into account . AGNS , and solving it 
for the gain function (Z(t)): 
    **( ) ( ) 1 . ( ) (0)RA RA RA RAZ T T Z T T Z T Z       
Which will lead equivalently, given ( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z   might be eliminated as a common 
term, and if Z(t) is monotonously increasing and injective: 
 **( ) ( ) 1 . ( )RA RAZ T Z T Z T    
 **( ) 2 . ( )RAZ T Z T   
From here we withdraw the dynamic profitability condition in which DRTTL (T**) comes 
define by the implicit function. Given the injectivity of the gain function, the gains on the 
threshold T** must exceed the double minus the literacy rate of the accumulated profits till 
the moment of leadership reform. 
Notice that if the literacy rate is null, then we will be in the case of figure 1, if the literacy 
rate is 100%, then we will be in the case that the DRTTL will be the bissectrix. 
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For an intermediate case (namely for the case of developing countries), if the literacy rate 
is 50%, then the frontier will be defined as: **( ) 1,5. ( )RAZ T Z T  - see figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 – PSLR Expansion with Literacy increase () 
  
Proposition 5: An increase in the literacy rate leads to a leaders to be (TB) DRTTLC 
improvement and to an expansion of the PSLR.  
As a conclusion of the previous section, the increase on the literacy rate leads to an 
improvement on the dynamic recovery threshold of leadership reform, i.e. the partial 
recovery of human capital leads to a more easily viable leadership reform for leaders to be 
(TB), which results itself on an expansion of the possibility set of leadership reforms. 
Demonstration: see figure 3 and Rocha de Sousa (2008:228-9). 
 
In this new setting of political change we can even assume that a very well prepared leader 
might appear and thus its bequest be more than 100%. He already possesses more 
embedded human capital than the agent who is going out. Thus we would have in Figure 3 
a line with a less steep slope than the bissectrix. This is the case of rare talent, but which 
might eventually occur. 
 
The learning effects induced in this Arrow (1962) context due to an increase in literacy, can 
be checked empirically. This further emphasizes the role of human capital, its transmission 
(bequest or heritage) and its’ further enabling viability of leadership reform. 
 
Bissectrix 
PSLR0 
2 1Z(T ) (2- ).Z(T )
2 1Z(T ) Z(T )
2 1Z(T ) 2.Z(T )
Z(TRA) 
Z(T**) 
 
0 ( 0)FLR  
 1 12FLR  
2 ( 1)FLR  
Z(T1) 
Z0(T2) 
Z1(T2) 
Z2(T2) 
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5. Conclusion 
          We have shown in the context of an economic human capital model the impact of 
political leadership change on growth. 
          Proposition 1 stated that wage growth after political leadership change yields 
economically inefficient outcome for the leader to be; thus, wage growth blocks human 
capital leadership change in terms of economic aggregate welfare gain. 
Proposition 2, stated that a decrease in wage growth after human capital leadership change 
might turn viable this process. 
          An analogous result yields for both the increase and decrease of the discount factor or 
a kind of interest rate (Propositions 3 and 4). 
         An extension of our formal Arrowian model allowing for partial, total or more than 
total bequests, enables us to assess again the impact of human capital leadership change. 
Our figure 3 stresses that bequests of experience, former leaders leaving a legacy, might 
enable to recover the loss of human capital of the incumbent facing the leader to be. 
Eventually, our model allows also encompasses for rare talents to appear, there might be 
more than 100% bequests, the new leader might appear with new ideas, processes and 
even better human capital. 
          Thus we have attained the aim of this paper: with a minimum formal model, rooted in 
the economic sphere, one can assess the impact of leadership change, or at least know what 
some of the limits and its possibilities are. 
         More formal work can be done on turning completely endogenous the political process 
on this formal economic model.  
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